Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...) in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. (shrink)

A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...) argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it. (shrink)

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...) does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action’s specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle. (shrink)

The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...) self-respecting defender of the luminosity of the mental would ever make such an assumption. Thus Williamson can only secure his controversial claims in epistemology by taking for granted certain equally controversial claims in the philosophy of mind. What emerges is that the best bet for defending an internalist epistemology against Williamson's attack is to take there to be a tight, intimate connection between (to take one example) our experiences and our beliefs upon reflection about the obtaining of those experiences, or between (to take another example) the rationality of our beliefs and our beliefs upon reflection about the rationality of those beliefs. (shrink)

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...) how the reasons that are present in a given context play off each other to determine one’s overall duties. However, the conjunction of these two theses leaves particularists without a coherent notion of a reason for action: posit too much irreducible context-dependence in the behavior of reasons, and the reasons-based framework breaks down. One upshot is that the particularists’ challenge to principle-based approaches to ethics has not, at present, been successfully made out; another upshot is that perhaps the best way to formulate that challenge involves renouncing the reasons-based framework all together. (shrink)

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...) on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both. (shrink)

Guilt and fear today have developed an unexpected quality: they contribute powerfully to the survival of humanity. The feeling of guilt proceeds from an elementary awareness: although the unequaled progress of science and technology in the twentieth century has undoubtedly ameliorated the conditions of human life, it also has given rise to an infernal logic of genocide and crimes against humanity, in which almost all nations, directly or indirectly, have participated and participate still. This awareness is joined to another, which (...) is itself accompanied by a primordial fear: for the first time in history, science and technology have endowed humanity with the power to destroy itself and the planet, without furnishing humans with the means of escaping their destined role as sorcerer's apprentice, for no science can tell us what to do with science. It is this double feeling of guilt and fear that pushes contemporary man to search feverishly for ethical foundations capable of furnishing discreet regulatory principles to underpin decisions and actions. From the point of view of contemporary humanity, ethics must be able to confer meaning and perspective on an existence which apparently has neither: “Now,” writes Hans Jonas, “we shiver in the nakedness of nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.”. (shrink)

This paper undertakes an in-depth examination of the intriguing argument for the existential import of negative propositions by the fifteenth-century Ottoman scholar Hatibzâde Mehmed (d. 1496) and the counterarguments by his disciple, Taşköprizâde Kâsım (d. 1513). It argues that this discussion is a significant example of Ottoman scholars engaging in long-standing disputes concerning the nature and ontological ground of negative propositions, which date back to Plato and Aristotle. It is also intended to underline the need for considering not only logic (...) texts but also works primarily associated with other disciplines in order to attain a comprehensive picture of logical discussions in the post-classical period of Islamic thought. (shrink)

Ten years ago, an issue of the journal L'Homme et la Société was entitled “La Mode des identités.” Most of the articles were about cultural identity, but the basic thrust of the work was “a critique of the ‘fashion’ of identity calling into question the validity of a notion as striking as it is uncertain.” Recently, a special issue of the journal Sciences Humaines, entitled “Identité et identités,” dealt with personal, familial, social, professional identities and only spoke of cultural identity (...) marginally and in a roundabout way. Finally, in a manual of Sociologie politique published by the Presses Universitaires de France, the author takes to task the notion of ethnicity inherent to cultural identity and pushes the critique of the ethnic group to the point of negating its objective existence. Must we think then that the notion of cultural identity is henceforth obsolete, that it has lost all pertinence? (shrink)

The dominant approach to understanding Islamic Business Ethics has been based almost exclusively on either interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna or influenced by Western understanding of Islam and ethics. However, there is a rich—largely ignored-tradition of ethical analysis conducted by Muslim philosophers which would broaden our understanding of Islamic ethics and hence IBE. We seek to correct this imbalance by examining works of Al-Ghazali, an early Muslim philosopher, scholar, and mystic. His approach to Sufism, combining an interpretation of revelation (...) with reason, can contribute to new developments in business ethics scholarship and practice especially in Muslim communities. His thought portrays a vibrant work ethic that, while based in Sufism, has important practical implications for business. We argue that including such historically and contextually recognized perspectives in our understanding of BE, both in theory and in practice, would work well with an audience that looks to Islam as a source of justice and proper moral conduct. (shrink)

In the Qur’an, human distinctiveness was first questioned by angels. These established denizens of the cosmos could not understand why God would create a seemingly pernicious human when immaculate devotees of God such as themselves existed. In other words, the angels asked the age-old question: what makes humans so special and different? Fast forward to our present age and this question is made relevant again in light of the encroaching arrival of an artificial superintelligence (ASI). Up to this point in (...) history, humans have exceeded other creatures in various respects; now a possibility has arisen that another entity, namely ASI, will exceed humans at least on the level of intelligence and power. In relation to the age of angels, pre-modern Sunni exegesis construed human distinctiveness along the axes of reproductive knowledge and stewardship. Both brittle, distinguishing markers will disappear in the age of the ASI. Conversely, a more resilient and creative Islamic response can be derived from Ibn al-ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) views on God and the imago Dei. Inspired by the Akbarian perspective, this paper construes human distinctiveness in relation to a capacity to expansively respond to God’s love to be recognized, a response that relies on (a) imitating divine virtues that operate in counterintuitive and illogical ways, and (b) exhibiting fragility and lack rather than exceptionalism. ASI, while responding already in part to God’s love, needs to make strides towards these traits before it can answer divine love as commensurately as humans can. (shrink)

Mamluks reigned in Egypt a long time is an era of Kipchak Turks that have influence management, and Kipchak Turks has been influential in a period in the administration there. During this period, that Turkish rulers do not know Arabic language well, Turkish language is spoken in the palace and also idea of being closer to Turkish manager screated an interest in learning. One of the famous scholars realizing that interest is Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī. Abū Ḥayyān by learning Turkish language (...) especially from Fakhr al-dīn Divrigi and analysing written previously works, wrote Kitāb al-Idrāk li-lisān al-Atrāk. This book has consisted of introduction, vocabulary and grammar section. We also aimed in our study to examine Kitāb al-Idrāk in terms of content and than in terms of lexicography of the linguistic branch. -/- SUMMARY Mamluks reigned in Egypt a long time and in its reign Kipchak Turks had influence in management. Because of the Turkish rulers who have military background did not know Arabic language well, Turkish language was spoken in the palace and also idea of being closer of scholars and notable people to Turkish rulers got brought an interest in learning Turkish. One of the famous scholars realizing that interest is Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745/ 1344). The true name of Abū Ḥayyān is Muḥammed b. Yūsuf b. Ali b. Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī and he is an Andalusian linguist and exegete. Abū Ḥayyān who came from a Berber family born in the Matahsharesh village of Granada in 654/1256 and died in Cairo in 28th time 745 (11 July 1344). There is not much information about his family in the sources, but it is mentioned that he has a daughter whose name is Nada, a son named Hayyân in his name, and some grandchildren which are named Muḥammad and Ummu Ḥayyān. Abū Ḥayyān became a famous as Ethīr al-dīn and at the same time, he is also known as Naḥvī, Ghirnātī (Granadian), Ceyyānī, and Nafzī. He took lessons in Granada from great scholars such as Abd al-ḥaķ b. Ali al-Anṣarī, Abū Ḥasan al-Ubbezī, Abū Cafer Aḥmed b. Ibrahīm b. Zubair, Ibn Abū al-Ahvas and became a proficient scholar and teacher in matters such as morphology, syntax, language, commentary, hadith, methodology of Fiqh and Kalām. He wrote about 18 works in different sciences and if we mention some of that are al-Baḥr al-muhīt, al-Nahr al-mād, Tuhfat al-arīb bimā fī al-Qur'ān min al-gharīb and some of his works have reached to our time and some of those did not. Abū Ḥayyān left Andalus for various reasons and visited many centers of science and eventually continued his scientific activities in Cairo. Abū Hayyān, who is a great interest in learning languages, has learned Turkish language with the other popular languages ​​such as Persian, Amharic and Himyarite language and written books about these languages. His mainly works about Turkish language are the Kitāb al-Idrāk li-lisān al-Atrāk, Zehv al-mulk fi naḥv al-Turk, al-Af'al fi lisān al-Turk and al-Durret al-mudiyye fi lughat al-Turkiyye. These works did not reach to our days except Kitāb al-Idrak. Kitāb al-Idrāk consists of three sections, namely introduction, dictionary which includes 2200 words, and grammar that is composed of morphology and syntax and this book which is known as al-Idrāk is written in the Turkish which is spoken in XIV-XVI century tongue and named as Middle Turkish Period-Mamluk Kipchak Turkish. The first chapter begins with basmala and continues with detailed his genealogy, personal record, praise to Allah and salawat and salaam to Prophet Muhammad. After this introduction, it is explained the intention of writing this work. The second chapter is a dictionary which the words are explained in alphabetical order. Although Abū Ḥayyān speaks about 23 letters in the Kipchak alphabet, he does not explain the words related to all, but examines 19 items. In this dictionary, it does not take part some letters, that is letters sā, zāl, zā (letters of lips which is written in English th); letters dâd, ayn, fa (letters of throat) which Arabs use. In the third chapter, there is a part of the tasrif (knowledge of morphology) which is generally called knowledge of morphology today. In this section, it is dealt with about the types of words namely, name of diminutive, name of belonging name, plural, agent name, passive name, exaggerated factor name, infinitive, name indicating the location, name of device, arbitrary name, and idâd (which adds are derivation of noun from name like lık, lik at the end of the word) and then it comes to the end with shadda. Section of syntax which is called by the author as consisted of compound and is prepared according to systematic of Arabic grammar begins with the sentence structure in Kipchak language. After that it continues with definite-ambiguous names, verb (orders, past, imperfect verbs), subject-predicate in nominal sentence, nevāsiḫ (additional actions helped change the meaning of the noun phrase), Arabic leyte which express by the actual wish mold and the like, such as two mef'ūl area of ​​the heart of verbs in Arabic told (I think) were deaf ( Turkmen thinks he), acts like it yet scientists (verb phrase in), acts offender (verb-subject), the abutment of the verb nefiy prepositions, prepositions, the nehiy (ban), passive verbs and naib-i fail (so-called subject); other elements of the sentence, called the act müteallakat are: cognate accusativ, direct object, time period (time complement), the envelope space (located complement), state (envelope), causative object, the exception, the specification, conflict of laws, the annexation, the oat, the dependencies: adjective, conjunction, confirm, the apposition; conditional structure. After these, he mentions to letters of meanings (huruf al-maani), and concludes this chapter with information about the date, place, and name of the author of the book. Abū Hayyān used induction method in the book. Since he gave the forms of the words in double, then the triple, quadruple, quintet and other forms. He tried to teach the pronunciation of words by explaining the etymology of word sand the changes of the voices. He examined the words which are synonyms/ contrasted, synonym voice, singular/plural, and words that are passed by foreign languages into Turkish dialects then they are turned into Turkish word structure; brought out witnesses from proverbs and poetries. As a result, in this work, which consists of dictionary and grammar sections, it can be said that it is used predominantly in linguistic information - translation method . (shrink)

RésuméCet article traite d’une solution au tristement célèbre paradoxe du menteur, généralement connu dans la littérature arabe sous le nom de Maġlaṭat al-ǧaḏr al-aṣamm. La solution est donnée dans un traité ottoman du XVe siècle attribué, entre autres, à Ḫaṭībzāde Muḥyiddīn Efendī. L’article la compare également à la solution du philosophe persan contemporain, Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī. Le court traité consacré au paradoxe est l’un des rares ouvrages des Ottomans sur le sujet et il aborde de manière exhaustive le paradoxe sous (...) ses deux formes. En tant qu’analyse de la solution offerte par le traité au paradoxe, l’article fait connaître à l’érudition contemporaine les discussions ottomanes sur le menteur, et il contribue à combler le vide évident dans la littérature sur le paradoxe dans la pensée islamique. (shrink)

This article begins with the premise that market-oriented development strategies require more than the free movement of the factors of production from one use to another; they also require a positive work ethic and an energetic and committed workforce. However, the existing Arab work ethic does not seem conducive to␣development and change. This article assesses some antecedents that might have led to the emergence of the existing work ethic. First, we address the potential role of religion in developing a value (...) system that is not conducive to growth and development. We also tackle family dynamics in the Arab world and the impact of family structures on personal and group development. Then, we move our attention to the educational system in the Arab world trying to uncover any common patterns in the various educational approaches in the Arab world that could have had lasting impressions on power dynamics in␣Arab societies. We also address power and leadership relationships and focus our attention on how groups actually function in the Arab world. Thereafter, we tackle what has emerged out of these societal institutions and relationships, and offer some implications marking out paths for international managers. (shrink)

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

Research exploring how students develop their perspectives on religious moderation through reading and understanding the Qur’an is underexplored. This study aims to investigate students’ religious literacy tenet as a process of constructing meaning about religious moderation from the verses of the Qur’an. The participants involved were three students with an excellent ability to read the Qur’an and who had a great interest in the study of the Qur’an. The data were collected through the process of reading the verses of the (...) Qur’an and its textual and contextual translation. The results of this study indicate that students with high translation amendments tend to have more ability to interpret the verses of the Qur’an widely as a form of verbalisation of thoughts.Contribution: This study provides clarification on student interactions, the interpretation process and the construction of the meaning of the verses of the Qur’an. Furthermore, the results of this study encourage lecturers to reconstruct the process of learning to read the Qur’an at the university level. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:We examine the practice of nepotism in the Arab World and analyze how a rational-legal model of bureaucracy was never able to take hold. We draw upon ideas from institutional theory and related notions of legitimacy to provide an explanation of nepotism’s extraordinary persistence. Then we use arguments to speculate how the appearance of institutional entrepreneurs who are advocates for a new hybrid form of nepotism might begin to colonize a social space created by larger political and economic changes that (...) are sweeping the Arab World. Those entrepreneurs must persuade other members of an extended family that the current practice of nepotism is typically destructive of a firm’s competitive performance. In addition, they will argue that nepotism as currently practiced violates teachings of Islam. This second argument is likely to be particularly effective with an audience that sees Islam as a source of universal notions of justice and fairness. (shrink)

The Sufyānī narration, which is also referred in some studies carried out today, is mentioned in the early Shiite and Sunnī sources. The anticipated savior perception of the period has an important place in understanding the Sufyānī narrations in the emergence process of which political and sectarian events were effective. Narrations stating that the Mahdī named Muḥammad, one of the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh), would appear in the end of times and establish justice by bringing order to the (...) world where oppression, injustice and inequity have spread, were effective in the political and social life after the Prophet (pbuh). The emergence of the Sufyānī narrations, whose intellectual infrastructure was constituted by the expected Mahdī perception that is effective in the society, was the result of the political conflicts of the period. The death of Muʻāwiya ibn Yazīd (d. 64/684), the third Caliph of the Umayyad State, without leaving a crown behind caused a political crisis. The cousin of the Muʻāwiya II, Marwān bin al-Ḥakam, the experienced politician who turned this moment of crisis into an opportunity and who was from the same dynasty but from a different family, took over the administration and thus the sultanate continued. Although the reign continued from the sons of Umayyad, the administration passed from sons of Sufyān to the sons of Marwān, who were from the same dynasty. This situation caused discomfort in Sufyānīs. Thus, Muʻāwiya II's brother Khālid ibn Yazīd, whose right of administration was seized from him, with the intention of gaining his lost reputation in the society and turning the pessimism towards his family into hope and desire, has been claimed to spread the savior Sufyānī narrations expected from the sons of Sufyān, parallel to the Mahdī narrations expected from the sons of Alī, which was influential in the society. Thus, the Sufyānī came to be expected like the expected Mahdī, who was influential in society and exploited by the Shiite sects in their own belief systems. The rebellions carried out by the sons of Sufyān against the administration in the 2nd century hijrī and afterwards were conceived as the appearance of the Sufyānī expected by the society and the person who led the rebellion was described as Sufyānī. The most important of these rebellions is the revolt of ʻAlī ibn Abdullah ibn Khālid nicknamed Abū ʻAmayṭar, formed by the coalition of sons of ʻAlī and sons of Sufyān who descend from the sons of Umayya. Abū ʻAmayṭar, who is considered to be the Sufyānī and some sections of whose life constitute a source for many narrations on the Sufyānī, declared his caliphate during the period of Abbasī Caliph al-Amīn (d. 198/813) and called for allegiance to himself. The announcement of his caliphate was considered by his supporters as the expected savior. The period of Abū ʻAmayṭar and the sayings about him are extremely important in terms of presenting the expected savior perception in the society, the Sufyānī understanding and the date of his emergence. Sections from Abū ʻAmayṭar's life reflected in the narrations about the Sufyānī in many Shiite and Sunnī sources. In this article, it is tried to examine the emergence of the Sufyānī narrations, its development and particularly its transformation within the Shiite sect, in a detailed manner and especially based on political and sectarian events of the early period. (shrink)

Mobility is becoming a defining feature of today’s globalising society. Individuals move for a variety of reasons, including finding employment or pursuing education. This paper focuses on the interrelationship between two different types of migrants who have all moved out of one specific country to another. It builds on the perceptions of Turkish graduates of German universities who moved cross-border recently to study in German universities, the self-styled ‘New Wave Turks’, to understand their place within the existing Turkish diaspora there. (...) Although the existing Turkish diaspora in Germany is well researched, as is how diasporas can facilitate further mobility, the interaction between these newcomers and the existing Turkish diaspora in Germany has received little scholarly attention. Through in-depth semi-structured interviews with recent Turkish graduates of German universities, we explored how the existing diaspora provides support but also challenges for the newcomers, complicating their experiences. We argue that international student mobility led to the emergence of a new form of ‘total diaspora’ in Germany, comprising both the existing Turkish diaspora and newly joined Turkish graduates of German universities. Social media was instrumental for these newcomers in setting themselves apart within the total diaspora, allowing them to create their own community identity. (shrink)

This article aims to evaluate the types of customary marriage, the reasons that paved the way for its spread, the sociological approach of the people with statistical data, and the evaluation in terms of Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence). In the study, it has been tried to reach the right result by considering the social reasons and legal norms together. In order to correctly evaluate people's orientation to customary marriage, statistical data was used in the study, thus it was aimed to reveal (...) the sociological dimension of the research. In the research, firstly, the definition of the concept of marriage, its elements, conditions and types were briefly explained and the conceptual, legal framework and imagination of marriage were drawn. Thus, the main concepts and norms in which the customary marriage will be evaluated and compared have been put forward. Afterwards, the definition of customary marriage, which is the main subject of the study, its types, the countries where it is spreading, statistical data, the reasons that paved the way for its emergence, and Islamic Fiqh from the classical to the present were made. As a result, customary marriage was performed in three different ways, two of which were permissible, one was not; It has been determined that the applicants for this wedding are generally those who want to have more than one marriage and the university students. It has been seen that this customary marriage has some positive and negative consequences, and those who look at its positive aspects are allowed, while those who consider its negative aspects are not. However, from the classical period to the present, it has been determined that it is permissible for the public to hide the two-witness marriage on the grounds that it fulfills the condition of announcement, even if it is demanded from the witness. (shrink)

II. ULUSLARARASI TEKİRDAĞ’DA DİNİ VE KÜLTÜREL HAYAT SEMPOZYUMU.

This study deals with the sceptical arguments by one of the most important figures in the philosophical Sufi tradition (the Akbarian school) and the foremost disciple of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al‐Dīn al‐Qūnawī. Though not a sceptic in the strict sense, Qūnawī employs sceptical arguments from relativity of rational knowledge and disagreement among philosophers to prove inefficacy of reason and rational procedures of knowledge in terms of achieving certain knowledge of metaphysical matters, namely of God and the ultimate principles of things. (...) The paper questions Qūnawī's implicit assumption that, if there is disagreement on a proposition p, then p is relative and thus cannot provide certain knowledge. It aims to philosophically analyse and assess his scepticism as well as to shed light on the largely unknown terrain of scepticism in the mediaeval Islamic world. (shrink)

In this work, the author deals with the source of Ottoman Family Law, its application examples and its transformation adventure, together with theory, based on court records in different cities. It reflects the examples of the concrete side of the practical applications of Islamic family law, the Hanafi sect in particular, reflected in the registers in the Ottoman Empire. In general, the application is in accord with the views in fiqh sources. However, the views in the fürû sources of the (...) Ḥanafī sect on some controversial issues caused difficulties in practice. In order to eliminate the troubled situations, the state power sought a solution by intervening with kanunnâme, adâletnâme and fermans at the request of Sheikh al-Islam. In addition to these records regarding the implementation of Islamic family law, the book also includes, the observations and notes of travelers, ambassadors and researchers who had been in the Ottoman country. Particular emphasis is placed on the parts that reflect the contradiction. The subject in the book is examined two parts as Classical Period and Ottoman Family Law in post-Tanzimat. In second chapter, it is stated that a radical change was made in the Islamic/Ottoman family law by including the views of four sects with the preparation of Hukûk-ı Aile Kararnamesi. (shrink)

This paper explores attitudes regarding tax evasion and the relationship between personal moral philosophy and such attitudes in a weak tax environment. The results confirm the multidimensionality of tax evasion attitudes. Idealism was negatively related to self-interest tax evasion attitudes while relativism was positively related to such attitudes. Idealism was also positively related to tax evasion attitudes stemming from concerns about the justice of the tax system. Idealists in a weak tax environment seemingly go through a cognitive reframing process where (...) they recognize that the tax system is unfair, and accordingly tax evasion is a way to serve a different moral absolute, that is of equity, rather than another different moral absolute, which is fulfilling obligations to governments. The results are also explained in light of the suggested low moral intensity of tax evasion among respondents. Policy implications are presented. (shrink)